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Abstract
This study develops a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their residential
locations and departure times from home in a monocentric city with a bottleneck located
at the entrance to the central business district (CBD). We systematically analyze the model
by utilizing the properties of complementarity problems. This analysis shows that, although
expanding the capacity of the bottleneck generates a Pareto improvement when commuters
do not relocate, it can lead to an unbalanced distribution of benefits among commuters:
commuters residing closer to the CBD gain and commuters residing farther from the CBD
lose. Furthermore, we reveal that an optimal time-varying congestion toll alters the urban
spatial structure. We then demonstrate through examples that (a) if rich commuters are
flexible, congestion tolling makes cities denser and more compact; (b) if rich commuters are
highly inflexible, tolling causes cities to become less dense and to spatially expand; and (c)
in both cases, imposing a toll helps rich commuters but hurts poor commuters.
JEL classification: D62; R14; R21; R41; R48
Keywords: time-varying congestion; urban spatial structure; bottleneck congestion; residential
location; heterogeneity
1 Introduction
Traditional residential location models (Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1967; Muth, 1969) have succeeded in
predicting the empirically observed patterns of residential location based on the trade-off between
land rent and commuting costs and have been used for evaluating the efficacy of urban policies.
These traditional models, however, mostly describe traffic congestion by using static congestion
models, in which congestion at a location depends only on the total traffic demand (i.e., the total
number of commuters passing a location), regardless of the time-of-use pattern. This indicates
that these models do not capture peak-period traffic congestion that takes the form of queuing at
a bottleneck. Consequently, we cannot use traditional models to examine the effects of transporta-
tion demand management (TDM) measures intended to alleviate it (e.g., time-varying congestion
tolling).
∗I am grateful to Takashi Akamatsu, Shota Fujishima, Yoshitsugu Kanemoto, Tatsuhito Kono, Ryosuke
Okamoto, Minoru Osawa, and Yasuhiro Sato for helpful comments and discussions. This research was supported
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The bottleneck model can adequately capture the dynamic nature of traffic congestion (Vickrey,
1969; Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981; Arnott et al., 1990b, 1993). This model provides a simple
framework for describing peak-period congestion that allows us to study the effects of various TDM
measures, thereby inspiring numerous extensions and modifications. The standard bottleneck
model, however, cannot be easily applied in the context of the residential location model, as
stated by Ross and Yinger (2000). Therefore, these models essentially ignore a spatial dimension.
Several studies have incorporated a spatial dimension to the standard bottleneck model by
embedding the dynamic bottleneck congestion into a simple monocentric model to study the
effects of imposing an optimal time-varying congestion toll to eliminate the queue. Arnott (1998)
provides an integrated treatment of equilibrium location and trip timing for the case in which
commuters are identical and the closed city comprises two islands with the central business district
(CBD) located on one of the islands. He shows that imposing a toll without redistributing its
revenues affects neither commuting costs nor commuters’ residential locations. Gubins and Verhoef
(2014) treat the conventional continuous location monocentric model, assume that a bottleneck
exists at the entrance to the CBD, and consider the case with identical commuters and a closed
city. Their model introduces an incentive for commuters to spend time at home and assumes
that a commuter’s house size affects the marginal utility of spending time at home.1 They then
demonstrate that congestion tolling eliminates waiting time in a queue and allows commuters to
spend more time at home. It causes them to have larger houses, leading to spatial expansion of
the city. Fosgerau et al. (2018) develop a different type of model by incorporating location choices
of homogeneous commuters into the dynamic congestion model of Fosgerau and de Palma (2012)
which introduces commuting costs (scheduling preferences) that are not separable in trip duration
and arrival time. That is, they assume that commuters’ scheduling preferences depend on their
travel time.2 This study considers the same spatial structure as in Gubins and Verhoef (2014),
but assumes that the city is open. They show that an optimal toll changes commuters’ scheduling
preferences, which induces lower density in the center and higher density farther out.
The results of these studies fundamentally differ from the standard results given by traditional
location models with static congestion, which predict that cities become denser with tolling (e.g.,
Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al., 1998). This difference arises from the following
reasons: in the model with static congestion, imposing a toll makes commuting more expensive; in
the model with dynamic congestion, tolling does not change the cost of traversing the bottleneck
if commuters are homogeneous. These results also show that an optimal time-varying congestion
toll itself plays no essential role in changing commuters’ location incentives. Indeed, we can see
that the assumption on commuters’ scheduling preferences is the key to altering urban spatial
structure in Gubins and Verhoef (2014) and Fosgerau et al. (2018).
Takayama and Kuwahara (2017) recently reveal that an optimal time-varying toll can cause
cities to become less dense and to spatially expand. To this end, they extend Arnott (1998)
by treating the continuous location monocentric model and by incorporating heterogeneity in
commuters’ value of time (i.e., willingness to pay for reducing travel time) and flexibility. Their
analysis shows that a toll changes commuters’ commuting costs, thereby altering their spatial
distribution. Furthermore, they demonstrate that congestion tolling helps commuters with a high
1Vickrey (1973), Tseng and Verhoef (2008), Fosgerau and Lindsey (2013), and Fosgerau and Small (2017) also
introduce the utility from spending at home.
2The assumptions of our model imply that commuters’ scheduling preferences depend on their type of job (e.g.,
shift worker, academic) but not on their travel time.
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value of time but hurts commuters with a low value of time. These results, however, essentially
depend on the assumption of quasi-linear utility (i.e., the income elasticity of the demand for land
is zero), which is inconsistent with empirical evidence (Wheaton, 1977; Glaeser et al., 2008).
This study develops a model of trip timing and residential location choices of heterogeneous
commuters that resolves the limitations of the previous literature discussed above. We consider a
monocentric city with a bottleneck located at the entrance to the CBD as in Gubins and Verhoef
(2014) and Fosgerau et al. (2018) and employ a utility function that allows the income elasticity of
the demand for land to be positive. We then systematically analyze our model using the properties
of complementarity problems that define the equilibrium and show that commuters sort themselves
both temporally and spatially on the basis of their income3 and flexibility. We further reveal that,
although the bottleneck capacity expansion generates a Pareto improvement when commuters do
not relocate, it can lead to an unbalanced distribution of benefits among commuters: commuters
residing closer to the CBD gain and commuters residing farther from the CBD lose. This occurs
because alleviating peak-period congestion causes the city to spatially expand and thus increases
commuting distance of commuters residing farther from the CBD. This result contrasts with that
obtained in Takayama and Kuwahara (2017), which observe that the capacity expansion helps all
commuters.
In addition, this study investigates the effects of an optimal time-varying congestion toll on
urban spatial structure. We show that imposing the toll changes commuting costs, thereby altering
commuters’ lot sizes and spatial distribution. To concretely demonstrate the effects of tolling, we
analyze the model for cases in which rich commuters are flexible and highly inflexible. This analysis
reveals that (a) tolling makes cities denser and more compact when rich commuters are flexible;
(b) it causes cities to become less dense and to spatially expand when rich commuters are highly
inflexible; and (c) in both cases, imposing a toll helps rich commuters but hurts poor commuters.
These findings differ not only from the standard results of traditional location models, but also
from those of Arnott (1998), Gubins and Verhoef (2014), and Fosgerau et al. (2018).
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model in which heterogeneous commuters
choose their departure times from home and residential locations in a monocentric city. Sections
3 and 4 characterize equilibria with and without tolling, respectively, by utilizing the properties
of complementarity problems. Section 5 clarifies the effects of an optimal time-varying congestion
toll. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
We consider a long narrow city with a spaceless CBD, in which all job opportunities are located.
The CBD is located at the edge of the city and a residential location is indexed by distance x
from the CBD (see Figure 1). In the city, land is uniformly distributed with unit density along a
road. As is common in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords. The road has a
single bottleneck with capacity s at the entrance to the CBD (i.e., x = 0). If arrival rates at the
bottleneck exceed its capacity, a queue develops. To model queuing congestion, we employ first-
in-first-out (FIFO) and a point queue, in which vehicles have no physical length as in standard
3We assume that commuters’ value of time is positively correlated to their income.
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Figure 1: Urban spatial structure
bottleneck models (Vickrey, 1969; Arnott et al., 1993). Free-flow travel time per unit distance is
assumed to be constant at τ > 0 (i.e., free-flow speed is 1/τ).
There are G groups of commuters, who differ in their income, value of (travel) time, and
schedule delay cost for arriving at work earlier or later than desired. The number of commuters
of group i ∈ G ≡ {1, 2, · · · , G}, whom we call “commuters i,” is fixed and denoted by Ni. They
have a common desired arrival time t∗ at work. The commuting cost of commuter i who resides
at x and arrives at work at time t is the sum of travel time cost αi{q(t) + τx} and schedule delay
cost di(t− t∗):
ci(x, t) = αi{q(t) + τx}+ di(t− t∗), (1a)
di(t− t∗) =
βi(t∗ − t) if t ≤ t∗,γi(t− t∗) if t ≥ t∗, (1b)
where αi > 0 is the value of time of commuters i, q(t) denotes the queuing time of commuters
arriving at work at time t, and τx represents the free-flow travel time of commuters residing at x.
βi > 0 and γi > 0 are the marginal early and late delay costs, respectively.
This study imposes the following assumptions about the value of time and the marginal sched-
ule delay costs, which is common to the literature employing a bottleneck model with commuter
heterogeneity (e.g., Vickrey, 1973; Arnott et al., 1992, 1994; van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011; Hall,
2018).
Assumption 1
(i) αi > βi for all i ∈ G.
(ii) γi/βi = η > 1 for all i ∈ G.
Assumption 1 (i) requires that the value of time αi is higher than the marginal early delay
cost βi for all commuters i ∈ G. This assumption implies that commuters prefer to wait at the
office rather than wait in traffic. If this condition is violated, there is no equilibrium that satisfies
the FIFO property (i.e., vehicles must leave the bottleneck in the same order as their arrival at
the bottleneck). Assumption 1 (ii) means that commuters with a high early delay cost also have
a high late delay cost. Under this assumption, βi (or γi) provides a measure of the inflexibility of
commuters i.
It is well known that the primary source of heterogeneity in the value of time is variation in
their income.4 Thus, we suppose that commuters with a high (low) value of time are assumed to
be rich (poor).
4Other sources of heterogeneity in the value of time include trip purpose (work or recreation), time of day,
physical or psychological amenities available during travel, and the total duration of the trip (Small and Verhoef,
2007).
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Assumption 2 If αi ≥ αj, then yi ≥ yj.
Each commuter consumes a nume´raire good and land. The preferences of commuter i who
resides at x and arrives at work at time t are represented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function
u(zi(x, t), ai(x, t)) = {zi(x, t)}1−µ{ai(x, t)}µ, (2)
where µ ∈ (0, 1), zi(x, t) denotes consumption of the nume´raire good, and ai(x, t) is the lot size.
The budget constraint is given by
yi = zi(x, t) + {r(x) + rA} ai(x, t) + ci(x, t), (3)
where rA > 0 is the exogenous agricultural rent and r(x) + rA denotes land rent at x.
The first-order conditions of the utility maximization problem give
zi(x, t) = (1− µ)Ii(x, t), ai(x, t) = µIi(x, t)
r(x) + rA
, Ii(x, t) ≡ yi − ci(x, t), (4)
where Ii(x, t) denotes the income net of commuting cost earned by commuters i who reside at x
and arrive at work at t. Substituting this into the utility function, we obtain the indirect utility
function
v(Ii(x, t), r(x) + rA) = (1− µ)1−µµµIi(x, t){r(x) + rA}−µ. (5)
2.2 Equilibrium conditions
Similar to models in Gubins and Verhoef (2014) and Takayama and Kuwahara (2017), we assume
commuters make short-run decisions about day-specific trip timing and long-run decisions about
residential location. In the short-run, commuters i minimize commuting cost ci(x, t) by selecting
their arrival time t at work taking their residential location x as given. In the long-run, each
commuter i chooses a residential location x so as to maximize his/her utility. We therefore
present the short- and long-run equilibrium conditions.
2.2.1 Short-run equilibrium conditions
In the short-run, commuters determine only their day-specific arrival time t at work, which implies
that the number Ni(x) of commuters i residing at x (spatial distribution of commuters) is assumed
to be a given. It follows from (1) that the commuting costs ci(x, t) of commuters i consists of a
cost αiτx of free-flow travel time depending only on residential location x and a bottleneck cost
cbi (t) owing to queuing congestion and a schedule delay depending only on arrival time t at work:
ci(x, t) = c
b
i (t) + αiτx, (6a)
cbi (t) ≡ αiq(t) + di(t− t∗). (6b)
This implies that each commuter i chooses arrival time t so as to minimize his/her bottleneck cost
cbi (t). Therefore, short-run equilibrium conditions coincide with those in the standard bottleneck
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model, which are given by the following three conditions:cbi (t) = cb∗i if ni(t) > 0cbi (t) ≥ cb∗i if ni(t) = 0 ∀i ∈ G, (7a)
∑
k∈G nk(t) = s if q(t) > 0∑
k∈G nk(t) ≤ s if q(t) = 0
∀t ∈ R+, (7b)∫
ni(t)dt = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (7c)
where ni(t) denotes the number of commuters i who arrive at work at time t (i.e., arrival rate of
commuters i at the CBD) and cb∗i is the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost of commuters i.
Condition (7a) represents the no-arbitrage condition for the choice of arrival time t. This
condition means that, at the short-run equilibrium, no commuter can reduce the bottleneck cost
by altering arrival time unilaterally. Condition (7b) is the capacity constraint of the bottleneck,
which requires that the total departure rate
∑
k∈G nk(t) at the bottleneck equals capacity s if
there is a queue; otherwise, the total departure rate is (weakly) lower than s. Condition (7c) is
flow conservation for commuting demand.
These conditions give ni(t), q(t), and c
b∗
i at the short-run equilibrium as functions of (Ni)i∈G .
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The short-run equilibrium commuting cost c∗i (x) and the income net of commuting cost Ii(x) of
commuters i residing at x are given by
c∗i (x) = c
b∗
i + αiτx, (8a)
Ii(x) ≡ yi − c∗i (x). (8b)
2.2.2 Long-run equilibrium conditions
In the long-run, each commuter i chooses a residential location x so as to maximize indirect
utility (5). Thus, long-run equilibrium conditions are expressed as the following complementarity
problems: v(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) = v∗i if Ni(x) > 0v(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) ≤ v∗i if Ni(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ G, (9a)
∑
k∈G a(Ii(x), r(x) + rA)Nk(x) = 1 if r(x) > 0∑
k∈G a(Ii(x), r(x) + rA)Nk(x) ≤ 1 if r(x) = 0
∀x ∈ R+ (9b)∫ ∞
0
Ni(x) dx = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (9c)
where v∗i is the long-run equilibrium utility level of commuters i and a(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) denotes
the lot size of commuters i at location x, which is given by
a(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) =
µIi(x)
r(x) + rA
. (10)
Condition (9a) is the equilibrium condition for commuters’ choice of residential location. This
5Note that the short-run equilibrium conditions depend on (Ni)i∈G but not on Ni(x).
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condition implies that, at the long-run equilibrium, no commuter has incentive to change residen-
tial location unilaterally. Condition (9b) is the land market clearing condition. This condition
requires that, if total land demand
∑
k∈G a(Ik(x), r(x) + rA)Nk(x) for housing at x equals supply
1, land rent r(x) + rA is (weakly) larger than agricultural rent rA. Condition (9c) expresses the
population constraint.
As is discussed in Takayama and Kuwahara (2017), traditional bid-rent approach (Alonso,
1964; Kanemoto, 1980; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015) is equivalent to our approach
using complementarity problems (for the proof, see Appendix A.1). Specifically, long-run equilib-
rium conditions (9) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach. Therefore, even if we use the
traditional bid-rent approach, we obtain the same results as those presented in this study.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Short-run equilibrium
The short-run equilibrium conditions (7) coincide with those in the standard bottleneck model, as
discussed above. Therefore, we can invoke the results of studies utilizing the bottleneck model to
characterize the short-run equilibrium (Arnott et al., 1994; Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007;
Liu et al., 2015). In particular, the following properties of the short-run equilibrium are useful for
investigating the properties of our model.
Lemma 1 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007) Suppose Assumption 1 (i). Then, the
short-run equilibrium has the following properties:
(a) The short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cb∗i is uniquely determined.
(b) The short-run equilibrium number (n∗i (t))i∈G of commuters arriving at time t coincides with
the solution of the following linear programming problem:
min
(ni(t))i∈G
∑
i∈G
∫
di(t− t∗)
αi
ni(t)dt (11a)
s.t.
∑
i∈G
ni(t) ≤ s ∀t ∈ R, (11b)∫
ni(t) dt = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (11c)
ni(t) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀t ∈ R. (11d)
Let us define time-based cost as the cost converted into equivalent travel time. Since that
cost for commuters i is given by dividing the cost by αi, we say that
di(t−t∗)
αi
represents the time-
based schedule delay cost of commuters i. Therefore, Lemma 1 (b) shows that, at the short-run
equilibrium, the total time-based schedule delay cost is minimized, but the total schedule delay
cost is not necessarily minimized.6
We let supp (n∗i ) = {t ∈ R+ | n∗i (t) > 0} be the support of the short-run equilibrium number
6As will be shown in Section 4.1, under an optimal time-varying congestion toll, the total schedule delay cost
(the social cost of commuting) is minimized at the short-run equilibrium.
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n∗i (t) of commuters i who arrive at work at t. From Lemma 1 (b), we have
supp (
∑
i∈G n
∗
i ) = [t
E, tL], (12)
where tE and tL denote the earliest and latest arrival times of commuters, which satisfy
tL = tE +
∑
i∈G Ni
s
. (13)
This indicates that, at the short-run equilibrium, a rush hour in which queuing congestion occurs
must be a single time interval.
By using short-run equilibrium condition (7a), we obtain
ci(ti)
αi
+
cj(tj)
αj
≤ ci(tj)
αi
+
cj(ti)
αj
∀ti ∈ supp (n∗i ), tj ∈ supp (n∗j ). (14)
Substituting (6b) into this, we have
(
βi
αi
− βjαj
)
(ti − tj) ≥ 0 if max{ti, tj} ≤ t∗(
γi
αi
− γjαj
)
(ti − tj) ≤ 0 if min{ti, tj} ≥ t∗
∀i, j ∈ G. (15)
This leads to the following proposition as given in Arnott et al. (1994) and Liu et al. (2015):
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1. Then, at the short-run equilibrium, commuters with a
high marginal time-based schedule delay cost (βi/αi) arrive closer to their preferred arrival time
t∗.
This proposition indicates that the short-run equilibrium has the following properties: if
marginal schedule delay cost of commuters i is lower than that of commuters j (i.e., βi/αi <
βj/αj), early-arriving commuters i arrive at the CBD earlier than early-arriving commuters j and
late-arriving commuters i arrive at the CBD later than late-arriving commuters j. This occurs
because commuters with a lower time-based schedule delay cost avoid queuing time rather than a
schedule delay.
By using Proposition 1, we can explicitly obtain the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost. For
the moment, we assume, without loss of generality, that commuters with small i have a (weakly)
higher marginal time-based schedule delay cost:
Assumption 3 βi−1αi−1 ≥
βi
αi
for all i ∈ G\{1}.
Under this assumption, commuters with smaller i arrive (weakly) closer to their preferred
arrival time t∗. Therefore, the short-run bottleneck cost cb∗i of commuters i is derived by following
the procedure employed in literature employing a bottleneck model with commuter heterogeneity
(see, e.g., van den Berg and Verhoef, 2011):
cb∗i =
η
1 + η
{
βi
∑i
k=1Nk
s
+ αi
G∑
k=i+1
βk
αk
Nk
s
}
∀i ∈ G. (16)
This indicates that commuters with high value of travel time or high schedule delay cost incur
higher bottleneck costs at the short-run equilibrium.
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We see from the results of this subsection that the indirect utility (5) is uniquely determined.
Therefore, in the following subsection, we characterize the long-run equilibrium by using the
properties of the complementarity problems (9).
3.2 Long-run equilibrium
We examine the properties of urban spatial structure at the long-run equilibrium. From (9b) and
(10), we have
r(x) + rA = R(I(x)) =
µI(x) if µI(x) ≥ rA,rA if µI(x) ≤ rA, (17a)
I(x) ≡
∑
i∈G
Ii(x)Ni(x), (17b)
where I(x) denotes the total income net of commuting cost in location x. Substituting this into
(5), the indirect utility is expressed as
vi(x) = (1− µ)1−µµµIi(x){R(I(x))}−µ (18)
Therefore, the long-run equilibrium conditions in (9) are rewritten asvi(x) = v∗i if Ni(x) > 0vi(x) ≤ v∗i if Ni(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ G, (19a)∫ ∞
0
Ni(x) dx = Ni ∀i ∈ G. (19b)
The equilibrium conditions (9) or (19) are equivalent to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions of the following optimization problems, which can be used to examine the uniqueness
of the long-run equilibrium:
Lemma 2
(a) The spatial distribution (Ni(x))i∈G of commuters is a long-run equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies the KKT conditions of the following optimization problem:
max
(Ni(x))i∈G
P ((Ni(x))i∈G) = P1((Ni(x))i∈G) + P2((Ni(x))i∈G) (20a)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
Ni(x)dx = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (20b)
Ni(x) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀x ∈ R+, (20c)
where P1((Ni(x))i∈G) and P2((Ni(x))i∈G) are expressed as
P1((Ni(x))i∈G) =
∫ ∞
0
∑
i∈G
v(Ii(x), R(I(x)))Ni(x) dx, (20d)
P2((Ni(x))i∈G) = (1− µ)−µµµ
∫ ∞
0
{
R(I(x))1−µ − r1−µA
}
dx. (20e)
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(b) The set of utility level (v∗i )i∈G and land rent r(x) + rA is a long-run equilibrium if and only
if it satisfies the KKT conditions of the following optimization problem:
min
r(x),(v∗i )i∈G
D((v∗i )i∈G , r(x)) = D1((v
∗
i )i∈G) +D2(r(x)) (21a)
s.t. v∗i ≥ v(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) ∀i ∈ G, ∀x ∈ R+, (21b)
r(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ R+, (21c)
where D1((v
∗
i )i∈G) and D2(r(x)) are expressed as
D1((v
∗
i )i∈G) =
∑
i∈G
Niv
∗
i (21d)
D2(r(x)) = (1− µ)−µµµ
∫ ∞
0
{
[r(x) + rA]
1−µ − r1−µA
}
dx (21e)
Proof The KKT conditions of problem (20) correspond to the long-run equilibrium conditions
(19). The KKT conditions of problem (21) correspond to the conditions (9a). Thus, we have
Lemma 2.
Since the long-run equilibrium conditions are represented by (19), the model of commuters’
location choice can be viewed as a multiple population game in which the set of population is G,
the set of players of population i is [0, Ni], the strategy set is R+, and the payoff is (vi(x))i∈G .
Furthermore, P ((Ni(x))i∈G) is a potential function of the game since
∂P ((Ni(x))i∈G)
∂Ni(x)
= vi(x) for all
i ∈ G and x ∈ R+. Therefore, Lemma 2 (a) suggests that a long-run equilibrium of our model
can be considered a Nash equilibrium of the potential game with a continuous strategy set, which
is studied in Cheung and Lahkar (2018).
The objective function P ((Ni(x))i∈G) of the optimization problem (20) is concave, but it is not
strictly concave. This implies that the equilibrium spatial distribution of commuters (N∗i (x))i∈G
is not necessarily unique. However, by using Lemma 2 (b), we can show the uniqueness of r(x)
and (v∗i )i∈G .
Lemma 3 The long-run equilibrium land rent r(x) + rA and utility level (v
∗
i )i∈G are uniquely
determined.
Proof See Appendix B.
By using the equilibrium condition (19a), we can see that there is no vacant location between
any two populated locations, as shown in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 The long-run equilibrium number
∑
i∈G N
∗
i (x) of commuters residing at x has the
following properties:
(a) the support of
∑
i∈G N
∗
i (x) is given by
supp (
∑
i∈G N
∗
i ) = [0, X
B], (22)
where XB denotes the residential location for commuters farthest from the CBD (i.e., city
boundary).
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(b) the land rent r(x) + rA satisfies
r(x) + rA = µI(x) > rA ∀x ∈ supp (
∑
i∈G N
∗
i )\{XB}, (23a)
r(XB) + rA = µI(X
B) = rA. (23b)
Proof See Appendix C.
It follows immediately from Lemma 4 that the indirect utility vi(x) of commuters i is given by
vi(x) = (1− µ)1−µIi(x){I(xi)}−µ ∀i ∈ G, ∀x ∈ [0, XB]. (24)
This implies that the optimization problem (20) is rewritten as
max
(Ni(x))i∈G
1
1− µ
∫ XB
0
∑
i∈G
vi(x)Ni(x) dx (25a)
s.t.
∫ XB
0
Ni(x)dx = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (25b)
Ni(x) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀x ∈ [0, XB], (25c)
This shows that the total utility is maximized in the long-run and thus the long-run equilibrium
is Pareto optimal. Note that since the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cb∗i is taken as given,
this does not indicate that the equilibrium is efficient but instead indicates that market failures
in the model are caused only by traffic (bottleneck) congestion.
The long-run equilibrium condition (9a) yields
vi(xi) · vj(xj) ≥ vi(xj) · vj(xi) ∀xi ∈ supp (N∗i ), ∀xj ∈ supp (N∗j ), ∀i, j ∈ G, (26)
where N∗i (x) denotes the long-run equilibrium number of commuters i residing at x. Substituting
(24) into this, we have{
yi − cb∗i
αi
− yj − c
b∗
j
αj
}
(xi − xj) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ supp (N∗i ), ∀xj ∈ supp (N∗j ), ∀i, j ∈ G. (27)
This condition implies that if Ii(x)αi >
Ij(x)
αj
, then xi ≥ xj at the long-run equilibrium,7 which
yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Commuters with a high time-based income net of commuting cost (Ii(x)/αi) reside
farther from the CBD at the long-run equilibrium.
This proposition states that commuters sort themselves spatially depending not only on their
income and value of time, but also on their flexibility. This is because commuters with a high
income net of commuting cost consume a larger amount of land and commuters with a high value
of time want to reduce their free-flow travel time cost.
7Let Ψi(x, v
∗
i ) denote bid-rent function of commuters i. Then, as shown in Appendix A.2, Ψi(x, v
∗
i ) is steeper
than Ψj(x, v
∗
j ) if and only if the condition Ii(x)/αi > Ij(x)/αj holds. Therefore, we can say that Proposition
2 is consistent with the standard results obtained in the literature studying the traditional location model (e.g.,
Kanemoto, 1980; Fujita, 1989; Duranton and Puga, 2015).
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Proposition 2 also indicates that if
yi−cb∗i
αi
̸= yj−c
b∗
j
αj
for all i, j ∈ G, (N∗i (x))i∈G is uniquely
determined. If there exist i, j ∈ G such that yi−cb∗iαi =
yj−cb∗j
αj
, (N∗i (x))i∈G is not unique because
the locations of commuters i and j are interchangeable without affecting their utilities.
By using Proposition 2, we examine properties of the long-run equilibrium. For this, we
assume, without loss of generality, that commuters with small i have lower time-based income net
of commuting cost:
Assumption 4 Ii−1(x)αi−1 ≤
Ii(x)
αi
for all i ∈ G\{1}.
For the moment, we also assume that all commuters i − 1 reside closer than every commuter
i for examining the properties of r(x) and (v∗i )i∈G at the long-run equilibrium, each of which
is uniquely determined. Let Xi denote the location for commuters i residing nearest the CBD.
Then, this assumption means that commuters i reside in [Xi, Xi+1] (i.e., supp (N
∗
i ) = [Xi, Xi+1]).
Therefore, we have vi(x) = vi(Xi) for all x ∈ supp (N∗i ). This, together with the population
constraint (19b), yields the following lemma
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumption 4 and supp (N∗i ) = [Xi, Xi+1] for any i ∈ G. Then, the long-run
equilibrium land rent at location Xi is given by
r(Xi) + rA = ri ≡
G∑
k=i
αkτNk + rA. (28)
Proof See Appendix D.
Substituting this into (61), we obtain Xi as follows:
X1 = 0, Xi+1 =
i∑
j=1
[{rj+1}−µ − {rj}−µ] {ri+1}µ yj − cb∗j
αjτ
∀i ∈ G, (29)
From these results, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 6 Suppose Assumption 4. Then, at the long-run equilibrium,
(a) the city boundary XB is given by
XB =
∑
i∈G
[{ri+1}−µ − {ri}−µ] {rA}µ yi − cb∗i
αiτ
(30)
where ri is represented as (28).
(b) the long-run equilibrium utility level (v∗i )i∈G, land rent r(x)+rA, and lot size ai(x) are given
by
v∗i = (1− µ)1−µµµαi
{ri+1}−µ yi − cb∗i
αi
−
i∑
j=1
[{rj+1}−µ − {rj}−µ] yj − cb∗j
αj
 ∀i ∈ G,
(31a)
r(x) + rA = (1− µ)
1−µ
µ µ
{
Ii(x)
v∗i
} 1
µ
∀x ∈ supp (N∗i ), (31b)
ai(x) = (1− µ)−
1−µ
µ {Ii(x)}−
1−µ
µ {v∗i }
1
µ ∀x ∈ supp (N∗i ). (31c)
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We see from Lemma 6 (a) that the city boundary XB increases with an increase in the time-
based income net of bottleneck cost (
yi−cb∗i
αi
). This shows that the spatial size of the city is affected
not only by commuters’ income and value of time, but also by their flexibility.
From Lemma 6 (b), we have
d{r(x) + rA}
dx
= − αiτ
ai(x)
< 0 ∀x ∈ supp (N∗i ), (32)
which is known as the Alonso-Muth condition. This states that, at the long-run equilibrium, the
marginal commuting cost αiτ equals the marginal land cost saving −d{r(x)+rA}dx ai(x). Thus, the
land rent r(x) + rA decreases with distance x from the CBD.
Lemma 6 (b) also allows us to examine the long-run effect of the bottleneck capacity expansion.
It follows from (16) that the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cb∗i decreases with the bottleneck
capacity s. That is, in the short-run, the capacity expansion generates a Pareto improvement.
However, we can see by differentiating the equilibrium utility level (v∗i )i∈G with respect to the
capacity that there can exist i ∈ G such that dv∗ids < 0. More specifically, since we have
dv∗i
ds
= (1− µ)1−µµµαi
−{ri+1}−µ 1
αi
dcb∗i
ds
+
i∑
j=1
[{rj+1}−µ − {rj}−µ] 1
αj
dcb∗j
ds
 , (33a)
dv∗1
ds
= −(1− µ)1−µµµ{r1}−µ dc
b∗
1
ds
> 0, (33b)
1
αi−1
dv∗i−1
ds
>
1
αi
dv∗i
ds
∀i ∈ G\{1}, (33c)
the capacity expansion cannot lead to a Pareto improvement in the long-run if there exists i ∈ G
such that
{ri+1}−µ
αi
dcb∗i
ds
>
i∑
j=1
{rj+1}−µ − {rj}−µ
αj
dcb∗j
ds
. (34)
That is, if (34) holds for some i, commuters residing closer to the CBD gain, but those residing
farther from the CBD lose from the capacity expansion. This is due to the fact that the expansion
increases the city boundary XB, thereby increasing commuting distance of commuters residing
farther from the CBD.
The results obtained thus far are summarized as follows.
Proposition 3 The bottleneck capacity expansion generates a Pareto improvement in the short-
run, but it can lead to an unbalanced distribution of benefits in the long-run: commuters residing
closer to the CBD gain and those residing farther from the CBD lose.
4 Optimal time-varying congestion toll
Studies utilizing the standard bottleneck model show that queuing time is a pure deadweight loss.
Hence, in our model, there is no queue at the social optimum, and the social optimum is achieved
by imposing an optimal time-varying congestion toll (e.g., Arnott, 1998; Gubins and Verhoef,
2014; Takayama and Kuwahara, 2017). This section examines the effect of introducing an optimal
congestion toll p(t) by analyzing equilibrium under this pricing policy.
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4.1 Short-run equilibrium
An optimal time-varying congestion toll p(t) eliminates queuing congestion. Thus, the commuting
cost coi (x, t) of commuters i is given by
coi (x, t) = c
bo
i (t) + αiτx, (35a)
cboi (t) ≡ p(t) + di(t− t∗). (35b)
Superscript o describes variable under the optimal congestion toll.
Since we consider heterogeneous commuters, the congestion toll p(t) does not equal the queuing
time cost αiq(t) at the no-toll equilibrium, and it is set so that travel demand n
o(t) at the
bottleneck equals supply (i.e., capacity) s. Therefore, the short-run equilibrium conditions are
expressed as cboi (t) = cbo∗i if noi (t) > 0cboi (t) ≥ cbo∗i if noi (t) = 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀t ∈ R, (36a)
∑
i∈G n
o
i (t) = s if p(t) > 0∑
i∈G n
o
i (t) ≤ s if p(t) = 0
∀t ∈ R, (36b)
∫
noi (t) dt = Ni ∀i ∈ G. (36c)
Condition (36a) is the no-arbitrage condition for commuters’ arrival time choices. Condition
(36b) denotes the bottleneck capacity constraints, which assure that queuing congestion is elimi-
nated at the equilibrium. Condition (36c) provides the flow conservation for commuting demand.
These conditions give noi (t), p(t), c
bo∗
i at the short-run equilibrium.
As in the case without the congestion toll, by invoking the results of studies employing the
bottleneck model, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 7 (Lindsey, 2004; Iryo and Yoshii, 2007) Suppose Assumption 1 (i). Then, the
short-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the following properties:
(a) The bottleneck cost cbo∗i is uniquely determined.
(b) The short-run equilibrium number (no∗i (t))i∈G of commuters arriving at time t coincides with
the solution of the following linear programming problem:
min
(noi (t))i∈G
∑
i∈G
∫
di(t− t∗)noi (t) dt (37a)
s.t.
∑
i∈G
noi (t) ≤ s ∀t ∈ R, (37b)∫
noi (t) dt = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (37c)
noi (t) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀t ∈ R. (37d)
Lemma 7 (b) suggests that total schedule delay cost is minimized at the short-run equilibrium
under the congestion toll. Note that total schedule delay cost equals total commuting cost minus
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total toll revenue. Hence, Lemma 7 (b) indicates that, in the short-run, the optimal congestion
toll minimizes the social cost of commuting.
From the short-run equilibrium condition (36a), we have
cboi (ti) + c
bo
j (tj) ≤ cboi (tj) + cboj (ti) ∀ti ∈ supp (no∗i ), ∀tj ∈ supp (no∗j ), ∀i, j ∈ G. (38)
Substituting (35b) into this, we have(βi − βj) (ti − tj) ≥ 0 if max{ti, tj} ≤ t∗,(γi − γj) (ti − tj) ≤ 0 if min{ti, tj} ≥ t∗. (39)
Therefore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1. Then, at the short-run equilibrium, commuters with a
high marginal schedule delay cost (βi) arrive closer to their preferred arrival time t
∗.
Propositions 1 and 4 show that the equilibrium bottleneck cost under the congestion toll cbo∗i
generally differs from the no-toll equilibrium bottleneck cost cb∗i when we consider commuter het-
erogeneity in the value of time. To see this concretely, we assume, without loss of generality, that
commuters with small i have a (weakly) higher marginal schedule delay cost:
Assumption 5 βi−1 ≥ βi for all i ∈ G\{1}.
Then, we can obtain the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbo∗i and commuting cost c
o∗
i (x)
under the toll in the same manner as in (16).
cbo∗i =
η
1 + η
{
βi
∑i
k=1Nk
s
+
G∑
k=i+1
βk
Nk
s
}
∀i ∈ G, (40a)
co∗i (x) = c
bo∗
i + αiτx. (40b)
This shows that inflexible commuters have higher bottleneck costs at the equilibrium under the
toll, which is fundamentally different from the properties of the no-toll equilibrium bottleneck cost
cb∗i .
4.2 Long-run equilibrium
We characterize the urban spatial structure at the long-run equilibrium under the toll by using
the short-run equilibrium bottleneck cost cbo∗i . In the long-run, the difference between cases with
and without tolling appears only in the income net of commuting cost. Specifically, under the
congestion toll, the income net of commuting cost is expressed as
Ioi (x) ≡ yi − co∗i (x), Io(x) ≡
∑
i∈G
Ioi (x)Ni(x). (41)
The long-run equilibrium conditions are thus represented as (9) with the use of (41).
Without loss of generality, let us introduce the following assumption, as in the case without
tolling.
Assumption 6
Ioi−1(x)
αi−1
≤ Ioi (x)αi for all i ∈ G\{1}.
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Then, following the same procedure as in Section 3.2 reveals that the urban spatial structure at
the long-run equilibrium under the congestion toll has the same properties as the case without
tolling.
Lemma 8 Under the congestion toll, the long-run equilibrium has the following properties.
(a) Let supp (No∗i ) be the support of the long-run equilibrium number N
o∗
i (x) of commuters
residing at x. Then, for any xi ∈ supp (No∗i ) and xj ∈ supp (No∗j ),{
yi − cbo∗i
αi
− yj − c
bo∗
j
αj
}
(xi − xj) ≥ 0. (42)
(b) Suppose Assumption 6. Then, the city boundary XoB and equilibrium utility level (vo∗i )i∈G
are uniquely determined and are given by
XoB =
∑
i∈G
[{ri+1}−µ − {ri}−µ] {rA}µ yi − cbo∗i
αiτ
, (43a)
vo∗i = (1− µ)1−µµµαi
{ri+1}−µ yi − cbo∗i
αi
−
i∑
j=1
[{rj+1}−µ − {rj}−µ] yj − cbo∗j
αj
 ∀i ∈ G,
(43b)
where ri is represented as (28).
(c) The spatial distribution (Noi (x))i∈G of commuters is a long-run equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies the KKT conditions of the following optimization problem:
max
(Ni(x))i∈G
1
1− µ
∫ XoB
0
∑
i∈G
voi (x)Ni(x) dx (44a)
s.t.
∫ XoB
0
Ni(x)dx = Ni ∀i ∈ G, (44b)
Ni(x) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ G, ∀x ∈ [0, XoB], (44c)
where voi (x) is expressed as
voi (x) = (1− µ)1−µIoi (x){Io(xi)}−µ ∀i ∈ G, ∀x ∈ [0, XoB]. (44d)
Lemma 8 (a) shows that as in the case without tolling, commuters with a high time-based
income net of commuting cost reside farther from the CBD. This and Proposition 2 clearly indicate
that an optimal congestion toll generally alters the urban spatial structure.
From Lemma 8 (b), we can say that the capacity expansion causes the city to physically expand
outward. Furthermore, although the expansion generates a Pareto improvement in the short-run,
it does not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement in the long-run like the case without tolling.
Lemma 8 (c), together with Lemma 7 (b), demonstrates that the equilibrium with tolling
corresponds to the social optimum given that the social cost of commuting is minimized in the
short-run and a Pareto optimal distribution of commuters is achieved in the long-run.
This lemma yields the following proposition.
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Proposition 5
(a) Commuters with a high time-based income net of commuting cost (Ioi (x)/αi) reside farther
from the CBD at the long-run equilibrium under an optimal time-varying congestion toll.
(b) Imposing an optimal time-varying congestion toll alters the urban spatial structure if com-
muters are heterogeneous in their value of time.
(c) The bottleneck capacity expansion generates a Pareto improvement in the short-run, but it
can lead to an unbalanced distribution of benefits in the long-run: commuters residing closer
to the CBD gain and those residing farther from the CBD lose.
5 Comparison between equilibria with and without tolling
5.1 Short- and long-run equilibria
In the previous sections, we have investigated the properties of equilibria with and without tolling
and have shown that the urban spatial structure changes with the imposition of an optimal con-
gestion toll. This section considers a simple setting to demonstrate the effects of the congestion
toll on the urban spatial structure. Specifically, we suppose Assumptions 1–6.
Under this setting, commuters with small i are inflexible and have a high marginal time-based
schedule delay cost. Therefore, they are willing to pay in travel time or money to reduce schedule
delay, thereby arriving closer to their preferred arrival time t∗ at the short-run equilibrium. The
difference between short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs with and without tolling is thus given
by
cbo∗i − cb∗i =
η
1 + η
G∑
k=i+1
(αk − αi) βk
αk
Nk
s
∀i ∈ G. (45)
This clearly shows that the sign of cbo∗i − cb∗i depends on the difference in commuters’ value of
time.
Commuters with small i have a low time-based income net of commuting costs both before
and after imposing the toll. This implies that they reside closer to the CBD at the long-run
equilibrium. Therefore, we have
XoB −XB =
∑
i∈G
[{ri+1}−µ − {ri}−µ] {rA}µ cb∗i − cbo∗i
αiτ
, (46a)
vo∗i − v∗i = (1− µ)1−µµµ
{ri+1}−µ{cb∗i − cbo∗i } − i∑
j=1
[{rj+1}−µ − {rj}−µ] αi
αj
{cb∗j − cbo∗j }
 ∀i ∈ G.
(46b)
(46a) indicates that the spatial size of the city can expand or shrink by imposing the toll due to
changes in the short-run bottleneck cost. (46b) shows that the difference between the bottleneck
costs with and without tolling affects the commuters’ benefits from the imposition of the toll.
The difference of the equilibrium utility level (46b) also shows that even if tolling generates a
Pareto improvement in the short-run (i.e., cbo∗i ≤ cb∗i for all i ∈ G), it does not necessarily leads
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to a Pareto improvement in the long-run (i.e., vo∗i ≥ v∗i for all i ∈ G). This can occur in the
following mechanism: improvements in the bottleneck cost increase the income net of commuting
cost and the lot size of commuters residing near the CBD; this causes the city to expand outward;
the spatial expansion of the city increases the commuting distance of commuters residing farther
from the CBD, which decreases their income net of commuting cost.
To see the effects of tolling more concretely, we introduce an additional assumption on the
value of time in the following subsection. Specifically, we analyze the following two cases:
Case A: rich commuters are flexible
Case B: rich commuters are highly inflexible
5.2 Simple examples
5.2.1 Case A: rich commuters are flexible
We first introduce the following assumption in addition to Assumptions 1–6.
Assumption 7 αi−1 < αi for all i ∈ G\{1}.
Note that Assumptions 2–7 are not too restrictive. Indeed, if the income yi of commuters i is
proportional to their value of time αi (i.e., yi = φαi), Assumptions 5 and 7 (i.e., βi−1 ≥ βi and
αi−1 < αi for all i ∈ G\{1}) are sufficient conditions for these assumptions to hold.
In Case A, rich commuters are flexible and have a lower marginal time-based schedule delay
cost. This implies that rich commuters tend to avoid queuing time and paying the toll rather
than schedule delay. Thus, they arrive farther from their preferred arrival time t∗ at the short-run
equilibria with and without tolling. The short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs with and without
tolling satisfy
cbo∗i−1 − cb∗i−1 > cbo∗i − cb∗i ∀i ∈ G\{1}, (47a)
cbo∗G − cb∗G = 0. (47b)
We see from (47) that optimal congestion tolling increases short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs
of all commuters other than richest ones. This reflects the fact that poor commuters pay a higher
toll and that the richest commuters are those who face no queuing cost at the equilibrium without
tolling and face no toll at the equilibrium with tolling.
The toll decreases the income net of commuting cost, which leads to a decrease in lot size and
the spatial size of city. This can be seen by substituting (47) into (46a). This means that the city
becomes denser with tolling, which is same as the standard results of traditional location models
considering static congestion (Kanemoto, 1980; Wheaton, 1998; Anas et al., 1998).
We see from (46b) and (47) that the difference between the equilibrium utility levels with and
without tolling satisfy
vo∗i−1 − v∗i−1 < vo∗i − v∗i ∀i ∈ G\{1}, (48a)
vo∗1 − v∗1 < 0, (48b)
vo∗G − v∗G > 0. (48c)
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This shows that rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from tolling in Case A. This occurs
because the spatial shrinkage of the city reduces the commuting distance, which helps commuters
residing farther from the CBD.
These results establish the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Suppose Assumptions 1–7. Then,
(a) rich commuters arrive farther from their preferred arrival time and reside farther from the
CBD at the equilibria with and without tolling;
(b) an optimal congestion tolling weakly increases the bottleneck costs of all commuters, which
causes the city to become denser and more compact;
(c) rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from imposing the toll.
5.2.2 Case B: rich commuters are highly inflexible
In Case B, we assume that rich commuters are inflexible and have a higher marginal time-based
schedule delay cost. That is, we suppose Assumptions 1–6 and 8.
Assumption 8 αi−1 > αi for all i ∈ G\{1}.
Note that Assumptions 2–6 and 8 are also not too restrictive. Indeed, if the income yi of commuters
i is given by φαi + ψ with φ > 0 and ψ > c
bo∗
1 , the sufficient conditions for these assumptions to
hold are given by Assumptions 3 and 8 (i.e., βi−1αi−1 ≥
βi
αi
and αi−1 > αi for all i ∈ G\{1}).
In Case B, rich commuters are willing to pay in travel time or money to reduce schedule
delay, thereby arriving closer to their preferred arrival time t∗ at the short-run equilibria with and
without tolling. Thus, the short-run equilibrium bottleneck costs with and without tolling satisfy
cbo∗i−1 − cb∗i−1 < cbo∗i − cb∗i ∀i ∈ G\{1}, (49a)
cbo∗G − cb∗G = 0. (49b)
The conditions in (49) shows that, in the short-run, a Pareto improvement is achieved by imposing
an optimal congestion toll. This happens because rich commuters experience larger queuing time
at the no-toll equilibrium and imposing the toll eliminates all queuing.
The conditions in (49) also indicate that the toll increases their income net of commuting cost.
This leads to increases in their lot size, thereby increasing the city boundary (i.e., XoB > XB).
This can be confirmed by substituting (49) into (46a). This means that the city becomes less dense
with tolling, which contrasts with the standard results of traditional location models that consider
static congestion.
By using (49), we obtain the following conditions on the equilibrium utility level, which reveal
that rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from tolling in Case B.
vo∗i−1 − v∗i−1 > vo∗i − v∗i ∀i ∈ G\{1}, (50a)
vo∗1 − v∗1 > 0, (50b)
vo∗G − v∗G < 0. (50c)
This is due to the fact that the spatial expansion of the city increases the commuting distance,
thereby increasing commuting cost of poor commuters who reside farther from the CBD.
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We summarize the results as the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose Assumptions 1–6 and 8. Then,
(a) rich commuters arrive closer to their preferred arrival time and reside closer to the CBD at
the equilibria with and without tolling.
(b) an optimal congestion tolling generates a Pareto improvement in the short-run, but it causes
the city to become less dense and to spatially expand outward in the long-run.
(c) rich commuters gain and poor commuters lose from imposing the toll.
5.3 Numerical examples
We numerically analyze the model to show the effects of an optimal congestion toll and the
bottleneck capacity expansion. In this analysis, we use the following parameter values:
G = 4, µ = 0.2, τ = 2 (min/km), rA = 500, (Ni)i∈G = (200, 1000, 1000, 200). (51a)
The values of yi, αi, βi, η are set to be consistent with Assumptions 2–8 and the empirical result
(Small, 1982):
Case A:
(yi)i∈G = (90, 120, 150, 240), (αi)i∈G = (0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.8),(βi)i∈G = (0.28, 0.25, 0.15, 0.05), η = 4.0. (51b)
Case B:
(yi)i∈G = (195, 190, 185, 180), (αi)i∈G = (0.45, 0.4, 0.35, 0.3),(βi)i∈G = (0.4, 0.35, 0.3, 0.05), η = 4.0. (51c)
We conduct comparative statics with respect to bottleneck capacity s. As we can see from
Figure 2, imposing the toll results in a denser urban spatial structure in Case A, whereas it leads
to spatial expansion of the city in Case B. Figures 3 and 4 indicate that, in both cases, congestion
tolling leads to an unbalanced distribution of benefits among commuters: rich commuters gain
and poor commuters lose. These results are consistent with those presented in Section 5.2.
Figures 3 (b) and 4 (b) also show that
dv∗4
ds < 0 and that
dvo∗4
ds < 0. This implies that a
Pareto improvement is not achieved by expanding the bottleneck capacity in both cases. More
specifically, commuters residing farthest from the CBD lose from a capacity improvement. This
is also consistent with Propositions 3 and 5.
6 Conclusion
This study develops a model in which heterogeneous commuters choose their departure times
from home and residential locations in a monocentric city. By using the properties of the comple-
mentarity problems, we systematically examine equilibrium urban spatial structure. Our analysis
shows that commuters temporally and spatially sort according to their income, value of time,
and flexibility. Furthermore, although the bottleneck capacity expansion generates a Pareto im-
provement when commuters do not relocate, it can lead to an unbalanced distribution of benefits
among commuters: commuters residing closer to the CBD gain and commuters residing farther
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(a) Case A (b) Case B
Figure 2: Difference between city boundaries with and without tolling
without tolling
with tolling
(a) commuters 1 (the poorest commuters)
without tolling
with tolling
(b) commuters 4 (the richest commuters)
Figure 3: Utility of commuters in Case A
without tolling
with tolling
(a) commuters 1 (the richest commuters)
without tolling
with tolling
(b) commuters 4 (the poorest commuters)
Figure 4: Utility of commuters in Case B
from the CBD lose. We further reveal that the imposition of an optimal congestion toll causes the
city to spatially shrink or expand—this can help rich commuters but hurt poor commuters. Since
these findings are fundamentally different from results obtained in Arnott (1998), Gubins and
Verhoef (2014), and Fosgerau et al. (2018) that consider homogeneous commuters, it is important
to consider commuters’ heterogeneity when examining the effectiveness of transportation policies
intended to alleviate peak-period congestion.
In this paper, we consider a city with a single bottleneck. Therefore, we need to examine
the robustness of our result by analyzing a model with multiple bottlenecks.8 In addition, it
would be valuable for future research to study toll-revenue redistribution schemes that lead to
a Pareto improvement. It is also important to investigate effects of policies other than optimal
8Kuwahara (1990) and Akamatsu et al. (2015) have shown properties of equilibrium of a bottleneck model with
multiple bottlenecks. Osawa et al. (forthcoming) extend the standard bottleneck model to consider a corridor
network with multiple bottlenecks and to allow each commuter to choose his/her job and residential location. They
analytically derive equilibrium job-location-departure-time choice patterns under a first-best TDM scheme.
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congestion tolling, such as step tolls (Arnott et al., 1990a; Laih, 1994, 2004; Lindsey et al., 2012),
TDM measures (Mun and Yonekawa, 2006; Takayama, 2015) for alleviating traffic congestion,
and urban policies (e.g., urban growth boundary, floor-to-area ratio regulations) to substitute for
congestion tolling (Brueckner, 2007; Anas and Rhee, 2007; Pines and Kono, 2012)
A Equivalence between the bid-rent and complementarity
approaches
A.1 Equilibrium conditions
We show that long-run equilibrium conditions (9) coincide with those of the bid-rent approach.
The condition (9a) can be rewritten asr(x) + rA = Ψi(x, v∗i ) if Ni(x) > 0r(x) + rA ≥ Ψi(x, v∗i ) if Ni(x) = 0 ∀x ∈ R+, ∀i ∈ G. (52)
Ψi(x, v
∗
i ) is given by
Ψi(x, v
∗
i ) =
{
(1− µ)1−µµµIi(x)
v∗i
} 1
µ
. (53)
Furthermore, since maxai [Ii(x) − {v∗i }1/(1−µ)a−µ/(1−µ)i ]/ai = Ψi(x, v∗i ),9 Ψi(x, v∗i ) can be inter-
preted as the bid-rent function of commuters i.10 This shows that conditions in (9b), (9c), and
(52) are the equilibrium conditions of the bid-rent approach (see, e.g., Fujita, 1989, Definition
4.2).
A.2 Relative steepness of bid-rent curves
As is shown in Fujita (1985), we can say that Ψi(x, v
∗
j ) is steeper than Ψj(x, v
∗
i ) if and only if the
following condition holds:
∂Ψi(x, v
∗
i )
∂x
<
∂Ψj(x, v
∗
j )
∂x
whenever Ψi(x, v
∗
i ) = Ψj(x, v
∗
j ). (54)
Differentiating the bid-rent function Ψi(x, v
∗
i ) with respect to location x, we have
∂Ψi(x, v
∗
i )
∂x
= −Ψi(x, v
∗
i )
1/µ
µ
αiτ
Ii(x)
. (55)
Therefore, the condition (54) can be rewritten as
Ii(x)
αi
>
Ij(x)
αj
. (56)
9{v∗}1/(1−µ)a−µ/(1−µ)i represents the amount of nume´raire good that is necessary to achieve utility level v∗
when the lot size of the house is ai.
10As shown in, e.g., Fujita (1989), this maximization problem defines the bid-rent function.
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B Proof of Lemma 3
The optimization problem (21) is equivalent to
min
r(x)
∑
i∈G
Nimax
x
v(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) +D2(r(x)) (57a)
s.t. r(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ R+. (57b)
Since the objective function of this problem is strictly convex, r(x) is uniquely determined. Fur-
thermore, the uniqueness of r(x) implies that the indirect utility v(Ii(x), r(x) + rA) is uniquely
determined. Therefore, (v∗i )i∈G is also uniquely determined.
C Proof of Lemma 4
For any xa, xb(> xa) ∈ supp (∑i∈G N∗i ), there is no xc ∈ (xa, xb) such that ∑i∈G N∗i (xc) = 0
since the indirect utility is given by (18). Thus, we obtain Lemma 4 (a).
Differentiating the indirect utility with respect to location x, we have
dvi(x)
dx
=
vi(x)
{
− αiτIi(x) −
µ
I(x)
dI(x)
dx
}
if µI(x) ≥ rA,
vi(x)
{
− αiτIi(x)
}
< 0 if µI(x) ≤ rA.
(58a)
Therefore, at the long-run equilibrium, the total income net of commuting costs satisfies
dI(x)
dx < 0
µI(x) ≥ rA
∀x ∈ supp (∑i∈G N∗i ). (59)
Furthermore, it follows from the long-run equilibrium condition (9a) that I(XB) also satisfies
µI(XB) = rA. (60)
Thus, we have Lemma 4 (b).
D Proof of Lemma 5
At the long-run equilibrium, the indirect utility (5) satisfies vi(x) = vi(Xi+1) for all x ∈ supp (N∗i ),
and this condition gives
r(x) + rA
r(Xi+1) + rA
=
{
Ii(x)
Ii(Xi+1)
} 1
µ
. (61)
Furthermore, from (9b) and Proposition 2, we have ai(x) =
1
N∗i (x)
. Substituting these into (4),
we obtain N∗i (x) as follows:
N∗i (x) =
1
µ
{Ii(x)}
1−µ
µ {Ii(Xi+1)}− 1µ {r(Xi+1) + rA}. (62)
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Therefore, the population constraint (19b) can be rewritten as
Ni = − 1
αiτ
{r(Xi+1) + rA}
[
1−
{
Ii(Xi)
Ii(Xi+1)
} 1
µ
]
= −r(Xi+1)− r(Xi)
αiτ
. (63)
Since r(XI+1) = 0, we have Lemma 5.
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